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THE ILLEGITIMACY OF PREVENTING NGO
PARTICIPATION
Steve Charnovitz*

N

ongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) have exerted a profound
influence on international action. Although NGOs go back to antiquity,1 the influence of transnational or international-minded NGOs
began in the 1770s.2 Historically, NGOs have been important catalysts in
the promotion of the goals of peace and disarmament,3 antislavery,4
women’s rights,5 humanitarian law,6 environmental law,7 human rights,8

* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., JACK C. ROSS, AN ASSEMBLY OF GOOD FELLOWS: VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS IN HISTORY (1976). There is also a large literature on the topic of “civil
society.” See, e.g., JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA
(1999). Some of this literature discusses civil society organizations as participants and
some does not.
2. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 190–92 (1997) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Centuries
of Participation]; see also CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds.,
1999) (discussing the proliferation and influence of international NGOs since 1875).
3. See, e.g., DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS
(2008); THOMAS RICHARD DAVIES, THE POSSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE
CAMPAIGN FOR DISARMAMENT BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS (2007).
4. See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS: PROPHETS AND REBELS IN THE
FIGHT TO FREE AN EMPIRE’S SLAVES (2005); JIM POWELL, GREATEST EMANCIPATIONS
(2008).
5. See, e.g., BONNIE S. ANDERSON, JOYOUS GREETINGS: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1830–1860 (2000); NITZA BERKOVITCH, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO
CITIZENSHIP: WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1999); DAVID S.
PATTERSON, THE SEARCH FOR NEGOTIATED PEACE: WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND CITIZEN
DIPLOMACY IN WORLD WAR I (2008); HILKKA PIETILÄ, ENGENDERING THE GLOBAL
AGENDA: THE STORY OF WOMEN AND THE UNITED NATIONS (2002); LEILA J. RUPP,
WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1997);
LINDA K. SCHOTT, RECONSTRUCTING WOMEN’S THOUGHTS: THE WOMEN’S
INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM BEFORE WORLD WAR II (1997).
6. See, e.g., JOHN F. HUTCHINSON, CHAMPIONS OF CHARITY: WAR AND THE RISE OF
THE RED CROSS (1996).
7. See, e.g., SHERMAN STRONG HAYDEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILD
LIFE (1942); ROBERT BOARDMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURE (1981); SARAH ABREVAYA STEIN, PLUMES: OSTRICH
FEATHERS, JEWS, AND A LOST WORLD OF GLOBAL COMMERCE (2008); Steve Charnovitz,
Learning from Early NGO Activity, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 338 (1998).
8. See, e.g., PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (1998); LINDA RABBEN, FIERCE LEGION OF FRIENDS: A HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGNS AND CAMPAIGNERS (2002).
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worker rights,9 and international economic law.10 Indeed, to quote José
Alvarez in his masterful treatise on international organizations, “no one
questions today the fact that international law—both its content and its
impact—has been forever changed by the empowerment of NGOs.”11
Although there may be disagreement as to when NGO influence commenced, few would deny the contemporary influence of NGOs on the
international plane.12
The importance of NGOs has led to a spirited debate about their status
in international law. Some scholars, such as Pierre-Marie Dupuy, have
noted a “paradox” wherein NGOs “do a lot . . . in the functioning of international institutions and the implementation of the law created in their
midst,” even though “de jure, these entities have no existence or a very
narrowly defined one . . . .”13 Other scholars, such as Anna-Karin Lindblom, agree that NGOs are influential, but are more optimistic about

9. See, e.g., JOHN W. FOLLOWS, ANTECEDENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION (1951); ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964).
10. See, e.g., GEORGE L. RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEACE: TWENTY YEARS OF
BUSINESS DIPLOMACY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1938);
CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW (2006) (discussing
the role of associations).
11. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 611 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Tullio Treves, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND COMPLIANCE BODIES 1, 7 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2005) (noting that “the role of
NGOs is becoming an important chapter of the growing field of the law of international
courts and tribunals”); CRAIG WARKENTIN, RESHAPING WORLD POLITICS: NGOS, THE
INTERNET AND
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2001); SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2005); THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL SOCIETY (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000); AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY (2002)
(esp. chaps. 1, 5); JULIE FISHER, NONGOVERNMENTS: NGOS AND THE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD (1998); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 957 (1996); Holly Cullen & Karen Morrow, International Civil Society in International Law: The Growth of NGO Participation, 1 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 7 (2001);
THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO NON-STATE ACTORS (Bob Reinalda ed., 2011);
BARBARA K. WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010). Woodward chronicles the history of NGOs as starting in
the nineteenth century, then covers the League of Nations period, and then points to three
generations of NGOs, beginning with the first generation (1945–91), second generation
(1992–96), and third generation (post–1996). Id. at 81–102. For another view of periodicity in NGO influence, see Charnovitz, Centuries of Participation, supra note 2, at 190.
13. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Conclusion: Return on the Legal Status of NGOs and on the
Methodological Problems Which Arise for Legal Scholarship, in NGOS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 204, 214 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy &
Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008).
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their legal status within the international plane.14 Considerable writing
exists on the issue of whether NGO activism is legitimate and whether
NGO activities are accountable.15 Some of this scholarship is largely theoretical;16 some of it largely empirical;17 and much in between.18 Moreover, there is a parallel literature on the legitimacy of intergovernmental
organizations.19
Considerable writing also exists on the benefits gained by the international system from NGO participation.20 The stream of benefits differs

14. ANNA-KARIN
LINDBLOM,
NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS
IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–22 (2005) (noting the increasing role of NGOs); see also id. at
519 (noting the frequency of use of the term NGO “participation” at the expense of “consultation”).
15. On accountability, see, e.g., Patrick Kilby, Nongovernmental Organizations and
Accountability in an Era of Global Anxiety, 5 SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 67
(2004); Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261
(2004); Erik B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International
Governance, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 139 (2005); NGO ACCOUNTABILITY (Lisa Jordan &
Peter van Tuijl eds., 2006); Michael Szporluk, A Framework for Understanding Accountability of International NGOs and Global Good Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 339 (2009); Diana Hortsch, The Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International,
Responsible Advocacy, and NGO Accountability, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119
(2010); ANNE HERZBERG, NGO MONITOR, NGO “LAWFARE”: EXPLOITATION OF COURTS
IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (2d ed. 2010); Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as
“Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society, and the United Nations, 36
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO
Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011
(2011); Oonagh Breen, Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Nonprofit Vulnerability, Legitimacy, and Regulation, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 947 (2011).
16. The best of that genre may be TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER
DEMOCRACY (2008).
17. See, e.g., CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? (Jens Steffek et al. eds., 2008); ANTON VEDDER
ET AL., NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY: SOURCES OF
LEGITIMACY (Anton Vedder ed., 2007).
18. See, e.g., J. J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES (1963); LINDBLOM, supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
20. See, e.g., George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st
Century: Ten Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L
L. 165 (2010); Monica Schurtman, The Challenges of Evaluating NGO “Success” in
Cross-Border Rights Initiatives: The Examples of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines and the Autotrim/Customtrim Initiative Under the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M.
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between the service-delivery NGOs and the advocacy NGOs. (Some
NGOs encompass both categories.) Service delivery NGOs, sometimes
called private voluntary organizations, carry out relief and other charitable activities on behalf of donor governments, international organizations
(“IOs”), foundations, or individuals.21 The Red Cross is an early example
of this NGO style. The advocacy NGOs (e.g., Amnesty International and
the International Chamber of Commerce) seek to influence governments
and IOs. Of course, whether any particular NGO contributes something
useful requires analysis of specific facts.
In my view, the value-added from NGOs on the international plane is
that they correct for the pathologies of governments and IOs.22 First, in
having a transnational orientation, NGOs provide a counterweight to the
nationalism of governments, particularly economic nationalism. States
seek to impose costs on other states and NGOs can counter such actions
by exposing them to public attention and arguing against them. Second,
NGOs can help governments and IOs address problems of market failure,
particularly those crossing borders. Often, government regulators are
slow to recognize a problem, uncreative in finding positive-sum solutions
to the problem, and stymied in addressing a problem because intergovernmental cooperation is impeded by a foot-dragging nation. NGOs ameliorate this predicament by bringing in data and expertise to show that a
problem exists, by putting potential new solutions on the table, and by
putting pressure of uncooperative governments. NGOs are said to help
generate “political will” by governments, meaning that NGOs use discursive methods to influence public opinion. Third, and related, NGOs are
especially adept at addressing problems of the global commons, such as
the atmosphere, the oceans, and biodiversity. Governments can set up
IOs to address these problems, but the catalyst to do so is often the civic
NGOs who then go on to help energize international decisionmaking.
Fourth, NGOs can address the problem of government failure either at
the national or international level. Whenever there are failed states,
Bratspies eds., 2008); Steve Charnovitz, How Nongovernmental Actors Vitalize International Law, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 135 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011).
21. See, e.g., Lara Stemple, The AIDS Funding Crisis: International Commitments,
Global Donors and the Role of NGOs, ASIL INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, Washington,
D.C.),
Dec.
14,
2010,
available
at
http://www.asil.org/files/2010/insights/insights_101213.pdf.
22. In contrast to NGOs which are spontaneous, self-directed initiatives, independent
commissions are another long-utilized approach of harvesting new ideas for international
debates. The legal scholar Ernst H. Feilchenfeld was an early advocate of utilizing a
“non-governmental board” to supply “impartial and reliable investigations, reports and
recommendations.” ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE NEXT STEP: A PLAIN MAN’S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES 46, 52 (1938).
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NGOs spontaneously ramp up their efforts to fill in for hollow governments.23 When there are failures in IOs, such as policy insularity when
IOs fail to coordinate norms with each other, NGOs can serve as competitors to international and national bureaucrats in debates before elected or
ministerial-level national government officials who make decisions at
IOs. NGOs can also call attention to situations when IOs get captured by
authoritarian governments. This happened, for example, with the United
Nations (“U.N.”) Commission on Human Rights.24 Fifth, NGOs bring in
their individual passions to international governance and seek to add new
rules that governments might not champion on their own. Human rights
is probably the best example. Even as early as the Congress of Vienna in
1815, there were NGOs and crusading individuals who championed the
introduction of human rights guarantees into international accords.25
Sixth, as enduring organizations, NGOs are in a position to stand up for
the needs of future generations. This is not to argue that NGOs are
uniquely qualified for that task, but they can manifest greater concern for
posterity than politicians and business enterprises. Seventh, NGOs also
work to improve the market by providing more information to consumers
about products and companies.
The question taken up in this Article is not whether it is legitimate to
allow NGOs into international governance, but rather the opposite: is it
legitimate to keep NGOs out? In particular, the Article explores whether
IOs, autonomous institutional arrangements, or other transgovernmental
organizations have a duty to provide opportunities for NGOs to observe,
consult, and participate. Or, to put it another way, do NGOs have a right
to participate in all forms of international governance?
The traditional view is that IOs have no inherent duty to provide deliberative space for NGOs. When IOs do so, and they do so regularly and
with increasing frequency, this practice is viewed as a consequence of
the positive law of the particular IO as written by its member states.26 In
other words, an IO may be open to NGO participation if states so legislate or may be closed to NGOs if member states prefer that insular arrangement. This first view can be termed the positive approach.
23. For example, there are many NGOs working hard on problems in Somalia, Sudan,
and Haiti.
24. The Shame of the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at C11. The new
U.N. Human Rights Council has been criticized on the same grounds. The U.N.’s Human
‘Rights’ Council, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2011, at A18.
25. Charnovitz, Centuries of Participation, supra note 2, at 195–96.
26. See Emanuele Rebasti, Beyond Consultative Status: Which Legal Framework for
Enhanced Interaction Between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations?, in NGOS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY?, supra note 13, at 21, 24–25.
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A second view is that an IO, as an organization with its own legal personality, has independent authority and volition to decide how to communicate with NGOs and furthermore that a rational IO would select the
optimal NGO participation to achieve the IO’s distinct functional mission. Scholars differ on what benefits NGOs convey to an IO. A very
favorable view is that NGOs can help to confer legitimacy on the international system,27 or that NGOs can reduce the democratic deficit of IOs.28
The perspective of the autonomous, NGO-friendly IO can be termed the
functional approach.29
A third view starts with a different assumption about the nature of IOs.
Instead of seeing them as persons with an individual, independent personality, this perspective sees IOs as a community of participants. At the
center of the community is the individual. Other participants include
government diplomats, other IOs and NGOs, business entities, and international civil servants. Not all participants have equal powers within the
IO, but the community of the IO should be as open and inclusive as possible. The participants in the community might seek to exclude uncivil
society, such as terrorists, but the IO itself would not be viewed as a decisionmaker. This perspective can be termed the community approach.
This Article proceeds in four parts: Part I explains the frame of state
positivism, that is, the idea that states determine the openness of IOs toward NGO participation. Part II explains the frame of IO functionalism,
the idea that IOs have the autonomy to calibrate how much NGO participation to permit. This Part further argues that a rational IO would permit
NGO participation as needed to help the IO achieve its functional mission. Part III explains the frame of community, the idea that an IO is a
community composed of individuals, NGOs, states, business entities, and
international officials. Part IV concludes.

27. See Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs Under International
Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93,
110 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
28. See James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit: an Essay in
International Law and its Limits, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 72, 83 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin Köhler eds., 1998) (“[T]he vastly enhanced participation in recent years of non-governmental organizations at the international level is one
indication of the pressures and possibilities for democracy in global decision-making.”);
DANIELE ARCHIBUGI, THE GLOBAL COMMONWEALTH OF CITIZENS 82 (2008).
29. Of course, another logical possibility is for an autonomous NGO-unfriendly IO to
decide that involvement in NGOs is antithetical to achieving the IO’s function.
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I. FRAME ONE: STATE POSITIVISM
The positive30 approach posits that the role of NGOs in a particular IO
is determined by that IO’s founding treaty as written by states. If states
do not provide for NGO participation in the IO’s charter or procedural
rules, then the IO has no duty to, and should not, welcome in NGOs.
Correspondingly, an NGO has no inherent legal right to participate in an
IO. The status of the NGO within an IO is solely a function of the rules
for participation legislated for the IO by states members.
Until recently, this view was widely accepted in the doctrines of international law. Even now, it surely states the majority view. For instance,
consider Cedric Ryngaert’s recent study finding that “Non-state actor
participation in international norm-setting processes remains a ‘discretionary’ decision of relevant bodies and institutions.”31 Additionally,
Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin’s study on the making of international
law observes that “it seems premature to assert that there is a right to access and participation” of non-state actors.32 Another recent study by
Anne Peters finds that “a customary right of NGOs to participate freely
in the international legal process does not yet exist.”33
The view that IOs have limited autonomy to make policy decisions on
their own is reflected in the decision of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) in the case involving the request by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) for an advisory opinion on nuclear weapons.34 In its decision, the ICJ denied the WHO’s request for an advisory opinion on the
30. In general, the move to positivism and voluntarism in international law was a
movement away from natural and religious influences on the content of international law.
As Georg Schwarzenberger explained over seventy years ago:
Formerly the law was a truth to be sought after, but now it becomes the equivalent of the will of those who give or refuse their consent. The relation between
international law and spiritual and other standards of value ceases to be regulated by a process of subconscious growth, and becomes dependent on the will of
those whose behavior is to be restrained or refined by the law.
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International
Society, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 65 (1939).
31. Cedric Ryngaert, Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the
Legitimacy of International Law, in NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 69, 81 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert
eds., 2010).
32. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57
(2007).
33. Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 222 (2009).
34. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8).
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grounds that the WHO lacked competence to request such an opinion
because the topic was outside the scope of the WHO’s Constitution and
its functions.35 In agreeing that the WHO request should be dismissed,
Judge Shigeru Oda explained that it seemed clear to him from the WHO
records that the request for an advisory opinion “was initiated by a few
NGOs . . . .”36 Although Judge Oda did not explain why NGO lobbying
was relevant to the Court’s decision as to the WHO’s powers, his judgment seems to indicate that the limited capacity of an IO to make its own
decisions can be diminished even more when the IO chooses to follow
the advice of NGOs.
On the other hand, there is a minority view that NGOs do have some
inherent rights to participate in international processes. In other words,
although it is states that decide whether an IO should admit NGO participation, states are constrained in that choice by customary practice that
prevents them from excluding NGOs. Few have championed this view as
boldly as just stated, but there are many scholars who suggest that a participation right for NGOs is emerging. For example, Lindblom reaches
the conclusion that “the question can be raised if the international legal
system will reach a point when NGOs have a general right to participate
in international legal discourse. I suggest that, as of today, they have at
least a legitimate expectation.”37 Peters’ article, quoted above,38 also offers more nuanced views. For example, she asserts that “NGOs have the
right to apply for an accreditation and be duly considered. Such a principle of openness has not yet fully crystallized into law, but is nascent.”39
Furthermore, she argues that “NGOs already enjoy a legitimate expectation that—when accredited—the participatory conditions will entail four
components: prior notification of meetings and agenda items, automatic
and continuous admission to meetings, the option to distribute documents, and being allowed to address the conference upon explicit permission.”40 Peters also calls for “recognizing a presumption of admissibility of amicus curiae briefs” by NGOs to international organizations.41
In my own scholarship, I have suggested that state practice is moving
“toward a duty to consult NGOs” in the “activities of IOs and in multi-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. ¶¶ 31–32.
Id. at 96, ¶ 16 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
LINDBLOM, supra note 14, at 526.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Peters, supra note 33, at 222.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 232.
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lateral negotiations.”42 I reached this conclusion by examining actual
practice, treaty law, and the views of highly qualified publicists.43 In particular, I found support in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual
Peace44 and Nathan Feinberg’s 1932 Hague Academy lecture on The
Petition in International Law.45 In Perpetual Peace, Kant posited that
“every nation should seek advice from philosophers concerning the principles on which it should act toward other nations.” 46 He then argued
that “The arrangement between states, on this point, does not require that
a special agreement should be made, merely for this purpose; for it is
already involved in the obligation imposed by the universal reason of
man which gives the moral law.”47 Over a century later, Feinberg, in a
Hague Academy lecture, explained that NGO petitioning to international
assemblies of governments began as a pattern of usage, but over time
developed into “an obligatory norm.”48 He described the norm as the
“obligation incumbent on international authorities not to refuse to receive
[petitions] and to follow up on them.”49 Feinberg’s essay gives numerous
examples of state practice in early international assemblies to accept and
take action on NGO petitions.50

42. Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 368 (2006) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations].
43. For references to the views of contemporary international law scholars, see id. at
371 n.161.
44. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (M. Campbell
Smith trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1903) (1795).
45. Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 42, at 371–72; Nathan
Feinberg, La Pétition en Droit International, 40 RECUEIL DES COURS 529, 628 (1932).
Feinberg’s essay is in French and the translations herein are mine.
46. Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 42, at 371; see KANT,
supra note 44, at 158–59. The role of the philosopher is discussed in Ian Hunter, Kant’s
Regional Cosmopolitanism, 12 J. HIST. INT’L L. 165, 182–83 (2010).
47. KANT, supra note 44, at 159.
48. Feinberg, supra note 45, at 631.
49. Id. at 632; see also Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 42,
at 371–72.
50. Feinberg, supra note 45; see also Charnovitz, Centuries of Participation, supra
note 2, at 192 (discussing the Webster-Ashburton negotiations of 1842), 193 (discussing
the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1856 ending the Crimean War), 195 (discussing the Congress
of Vienna of 1815), 196 (discussing the Congress of Berlin of 1878 and the Brussels
Congress of 1889–90 on ending the slave trade), 196–97 (discussing the First Hague
Peace Conference of 1899).
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II. FRAME TWO: FUNCTIONALISM
The functional view is that the inclusion of NGOs is up to the IO itself
and that the IO should embrace NGOs to the extent that it promotes the
purpose of the IO. The vision of the IO as a person with legal personality
and autonomy goes back to the late nineteenth century.51 Today, international scholars typically view the IO as an independent actor having its
own identity and will.52 If an IO has some autonomy, then it has at least
some discretion to act without authorization by governments. One early
exponent of this frame was the Austrian legal scholar Karl Zemanek
who, in a book on international organizations written in 1957,53 addressed the “contracts on ‘consultation’ between [IOs] and private international organizations.”54 This field of law was considered new and
“fragmentary,” and the “norms [were], at [that] time, unilaterally posited
by the international organizations.”55
ICJ decisions seem to embrace the view that IOs can exercise powers
not explicitly delegated by its founding treaty. In the Reparations case,
the ICJ states with respect to the United Nations that “Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.”56 The same sentiment appears in the ICJ Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion referenced above.57 The Court explains that “the necessities of
international life may point to the need for organizations, in order to
51. See CATHERINE BRÖLMANN, THE INSTITUTIONAL VIEW IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 44–48 (2007); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 11, at 129–39. For further discussion
of IO personality, see David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations:
Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 275 (1996);
Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94
AM. J. INT’L L. 623 (2000).
52. See generally DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR
EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2005).
53. KARL ZEMANEK, DAS VERTRAGSRECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN
(1957).
54. Josef L. Kunz, Book Review, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 565, 566 (1958) (reviewing
KARL ZEMANEK, DAS VERTRAGSRECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN (1957)).
55. Id.
56. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. 11). The Opinion also states that the United Nations
is not “merely a centre for harmonizing” national actions because the United Nations has
also been “equipped . . . with organs . . . [with] special tasks.” Id. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 25 (July 8).
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achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not expressly provided for in the basic instruments which govern their activities.”58 In neither opinion does the Court state that an IO could act in disregard of a collective dictate from member governments. Yet the ICJ
opinions do suggest that IOs have some autonomous decisionmaking
authority. One theory of IOs goes even further to suggest that IOs have
“inherent powers to perform . . . those acts which they need to perform to
attain their aims,” and that the source of this authority comes from organizationhood.59
In contrast to the Positive frame, which holds that states determine
whether NGOs can participate in an IO, the Functional frame holds that
the IO itself has some authority for deciding whether to invite and utilize
NGO participation. Viewing the IO as a person with discretion leads to
the normative question of how the IO should decide what amount of
NGO participation is appropriate. My own answer to that question is that
a rational IO would choose the amount of NGO participation most appropriate for achieving its functions and no more. Conceivably for some
functions, the degree of optimal NGO participation might be zero. But
for all (or nearly all) IO functions, NGO participation (including business
NGOs) would appear to help the IO achieve its purposes.60 For example,
UNAIDS is governed by a Programme Coordinating Board that includes
five representatives from NGOs.61
Why would an IO need NGO participation when the IO already has the
benefit of national officials and international civil servants? The question
almost answers itself. National officials and international civil servants
alone are too parochial, cautious, and unimaginative to get much done.
Skeptics of greater international governance point out that there can be
an unholy alliance between IOs and international NGOs who share a
common interest in more lawmaking.62 Although the critics may sometimes be wrong in opposing certain global rules, they are surely right in

58. Id.
59. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 75
(2002) (discussing Finn Seyersted’s work of 1963).
60. This author knows of no area of functional intergovernmental cooperation in
which NGOs have not already made a signal contribution.
61. UNAIDS
Programme
Coordinating
Board,
UNAIDS,
http://www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids/unaidsprogrammecoordinatingboard/ (last visited
Apr. 9, 2011).
62. See, e.g., MARGUERITE A. PEETERS, HIJACKING DEMOCRACY: THE POWER SHIFT TO
THE UNELECTED (AEI ed., 2001); JAMES M. SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS: INSIDE THE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ESTABLISHMENT (1998).
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seeing a symbiotic relationship between IOs and NGOs.63 My own
scholarship shows that this symbiosis began in the nineteenth century
and has gotten much stronger in the last 30 years.64
IOs operate at considerable distance from democratic processes such as
elections. This challenge of distance has led political theorists, such as
Robert Dahl, to question whether IOs can ever be democratic.65 As I
have elsewhere stated, I am not as pessimistic as Dahl on that point,66 nor
do I subscribe to the oft-stated criticism67 that the distance between the
IO and the public necessarily detracts from its legitimacy. But I think it is
clear that the distance from the public undermines the effectiveness of
many IOs, as does the claim that IOs have a democratic deficit. Thus,
IOs should promote NGO participation not merely to gratify NGOs, but
also to promote the long-term effectiveness of the IO itself.
What is the cost to the IO of allowing in NGOs? There are several. If
NGOs participate, the IO will inevitably have to increase its disclosure
and transparency.68 If the IO has policies or practices that factions of the
public would disagree with if they became known, then NGO participation might lead to greater pressure from outside to change those policies
or practices. Second, once NGOs participate, they are sure to discover
conflicts between the IO’s policies and the NGO’s vision of a good
world order. For example, it is not universally known that the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) prohibits governments from using a gold

63. See Kenneth Anderson, Review Essay, What NGO Accountability Means—And
Does Not Mean, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 170, 171–72 (2009) (quoting then-Secretary General
Kofi Annan as saying “that ‘global people power’ was the ‘best thing for [the] United
Nations’ in a ‘long time’”).
64. See generally Charnovitz, Centuries of Participation, supra note 2.
65. Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic?, in
DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19, 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
66. Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance (Paris, 1919), 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 57 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Address at Bocconi University:
Global Governance: Lessons from Europe (Nov. 9, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl142_e.htm) (“Since legitimacy depends
on the closeness of the relationship between the individual and the decision-making process, the challenge of global governance is distance.”).
68. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Changing Roles of International Organizations: Global Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV.
655, 660 (2009) (“Transparency may be achieved by greater proximity between international organizations, non-State actors and individuals. . . . [A]llowing non-State actors to
participate in decisionmaking processes can be seen as a form of transparency.”).
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standard in an exchange agreement.69 At present, the IMF provides little
opportunity for NGO participation. If there were greater awareness of the
way that the IMF limits the sovereignty of governments regarding a gold
standard, some NGOs would likely lobby to emancipate governments
and to allow gold to serve as a counterweight against reckless monetary
and fiscal expansion. Third, as NGO participation can enhance the accountability of an IO,70 such participation is costly to the IO insiders to
the extent that it cabins their discretion.
Experience over the past 20 years has shown that NGOs are especially
good at pointing out the tensions between the norms of different international organizations and often work to promote more harmony between
them. A leading example of this is the debate on trade and environment,
in which NGOs called attention to international trade rules that seemed
to jeopardize national environmental regulation. When this first happened in the early 1990s, the multilateral trading system was quite defensive about it and accused the NGOs of not understanding the benefits of
trade.71 Eventually, however, the trading system came to embrace environmental quality and sustainable development as one of its own
norms.72 So, the NGO pressure that might have been viewed as a cost in
the beginning later came to be a benefit to the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”).
In my view, a rational IO would want to avoid the problem of insular
functionality. Such insularity occurs when an IO is too inward looking
and does not think through its relationship with other IOs. A rational IO
would want the assistance of NGOs that could help the IO develop greater harmony with the programs of other IOs. Of course, there is a difference between saying that an IO should welcome NGOs and that it has a
legal obligation to do so. It is often said that IOs have an obligation to
69. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. IV, § 2(b), Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
70. John Clark, The Role of Transnational Civil Society in Promoting Transparency
and Accountability in Global Governance, in ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY: EMERGING
TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 44 (G. Shabbir Cheema & Vesselin Popovski eds.,
2010); Edith Brown Weiss, International Law in a Kaleidoscopic World, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L
L. 21, 27 (2010) (“For international institutions, the bottom-up approach means that the
institutions are accountable not only to the states that established them but, significantly,
to the communities, groups, and individuals they are intended to serve.”).
71. See 1 GEN. AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90–91, at
19–39 (1992) (special section on trade and the environment).
72. Michael M. Weinstein & Steve Charnovitz, The Greening of the WTO, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 147; see also THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002).
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obey international law, but whether international law provides NGOs
with a right to participate is uncertain and contested, as noted above.73 If
NGOs do enjoy such a right, then arguably that right is opposable to IOs
in the same way that it would be opposable to states.
The ongoing project by the International Law Commission (“ILC”) on
the Responsibility of International Organizations details how an IO is to
be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act. 74 Unfortunately,
the draft articles do not detail which acts are wrongful. Perhaps in a future project, the ILC could delineate the IO responsibilities that are different from state responsibilities. Of course, it is doubtful that the ILC
would ever say that IOs have a duty to allow NGO participation, because
the ILC itself has resisted suggestions that it seek NGO participation and
public comment.75 On the other hand, the fact that there is a concurrent
practice in nearly every IO to be open to NGO input may suggest the
fruition of an international custom of openness that IOs may already perceive as a legal obligation.
III. FRAME THREE: COMMUNITY
Rather than viewing an IO anthropomorphically as a corporate person
who operates according to her will, an alternative, more realistic, view is
that an IO is a place where a community of actors debates and makes
decisions. I call this the community frame because the IO operates as a
community, or epistemic community, where experts focus on a particular
range of public problems. I credit David Bederman with the insight that
the modern IO is better conceived as a place rather than as a person, actor, or lawmaker.76 Bederman, a fine legal historian, traces this idea back
to Otto von Gierke, Paul Reinsch, Pierre Kazansky, and Donisio Anzilotti.77

73. See supra text accompanying notes 31–33.
74. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st sess, May 4–June 5, July 6–Aug. 7, 2009,
U.N. DOC. A/64/10; GAOR, 64th Sess, Supp. No. 10 (2009), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2009/2009report.htm. This ILC project has not included NGOs under the rubric of international organization. See Andrew Clapham, The
Role of the Individual in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25, 28–29 (2010).
75. See generally Steve Charnovitz, New Opportunities for Nongovernmental Actors
in the International Law Commission (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 508, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616868.
76. Steve Charnovitz, The Relevance of Non-State Actors to International Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 543, 547–48 (Rüdiger
Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005).
77. Bederman, supra note 51, at 352–53, 371–72.

2011] ILLEGITIMACY OF PREVENTING NGO PARTICIPATION

905

Metaphorically, I would situate the individual (rather than the state) at
the center of that community.78 Imagining an international community as
state-centric is a contradiction in terms. The state may be the center of
the national community, but it can hardly be the center of the international community when states hold themselves out to be sovereign and
independent from each other.79 In other words, an international community comprising only sovereign states has no center.
Thus, the core of the IO can be modeled as an individual engaged in
multiple legal orders. The nineteenth-century Scottish legal philosopher
James Lorimer was one of the first to appreciate this modern reality. In
his Institutes of the Law of Nations, Lorimer explained:
If there is not an international man, neither is there a national man. So
long as there are two nations in the world, every citizen of each of them
must eo ipso be an international man, and cannot eo ipso be only an international man. In order that he may be either national or international,
he must be both; and must be governed, or must govern himself, in
both capacities.80

Viewed in this way, a particular IO is an arena where individuals address
transborder problems through the use of overlapping legal orders. One of
the key issues to be decided with respect to any problem is at what level
the problem should be addressed. The doctrine of subsidiarity suggests
that problems should be dealt with at the lowest level in which a solution
may still be obtained.81
The arena of modern governance is more horizontal than vertical and
de-emphasizes status and hierarchy. As World Bank President Robert
Zoellick recently explained:
Modern multilateralism will not be a constricted club with more left
outside than seated within. It will look more like the global sprawl of
the Internet, interconnecting countries, companies, individuals, and
NGOs through a flexible network. Legitimate and effective multilateral
institutions, backed by resources and capable of delivering results, can

78. Recall in that regard the U.N. Charter which begins “We the Peoples of the United Nations . . . .” U.N. Charter pmbl.
79. See Gregory H. Fox, Internationalizing National Politics: Lessons for International Organizations, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 265, 282 (2007) (“International organizations
have only a tenuous call on state loyalty.”).
80. 2 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 261 (Edinburgh &
London, W. Blackwood & Sons 1884). The quoted passage comes from a chapter titled,
“Want of an International Nation.” Id.
81. See Dinah Shelton, Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human Rights, in BROADENING
THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 43–49 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993).
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form an interconnecting tissue, reaching across the skeletal architecture
of this dynamic, multi-polar system.82

Individuals join with likeminded colleagues, forming NGOs to influence
global plural legal orders.83 Using NGOs makes it possible for an individual to delegate the function of representing himself. Social and economic NGOs are also efficient in that an individual interested in, say,
environment and peace, can join two different NGO social networks,
both of which will be specialized in its own area. Because NGOs are so
important in allowing individuals to form and present their views, one
might say that the core principle of international community is freedom
of association.84
A robust norm of freedom of association would forbid IOs or states
from interfering with the legal capacity of an NGO to lobby for its interests. This point was postulated clearly in the late nineteenth century by
Pope Leo XIII, who explained in the great encyclical Rerum Novarum:
[A]lthough they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of
the commonwealth, [private societies] cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a “society” of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its
office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and, if it forbid its
citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own
existence, for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society.85

In 1944, a transnational committee tasked by the American Law Institute
(“ALI”) developed the “Statement of Essential Human Rights” that became an important foundational document for the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ALI Statement lists “the Freedom

82. Robert B. Zoellick, The End of the Third World, INT’L ECON., Spring 2010, at 40,
43.
83. See generally Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, Pluralism of Legal and Value
Systems and International Law, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (1955); Paul Schiff Berman,
Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); MACDONALD, supra note 16, at
163–92 (the chapter on “Theorizing Global Representative Agency: Non-Electoral Authorization and Accountability”).
84. See Greg Lebedev & John Sweeney, On Free Association, Business and Labor
Agree, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, at A19.
85. LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM: ENCYCLICAL OF POPE LEO XIII ON CAPITAL AND
LABOR
¶
51
(1891),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html.
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to Form Associations” as an essential human right and posits that “The
state has a duty to protect this freedom.”86
Although traditional democratic theory imagines that individuals delegate their will to elected representatives, a more realistic view is that the
individual is born into legal orders, such as family, church, local government, national government, and international government, and then in
the process of socialization learns how to obey, evade, and/or to work to
change such legal orders. To argue that the elected official is the better
representative of the individual than the NGO is to miss the point that the
individual voluntarily chooses what NGO she joins but does not, merely
by voting, get to choose the elected officials that make decisions for her.
One should not assume that on any particular issue, such as climate
change, an individual has delegated more decisionmaking to an elected
politician rather than to a NGO. Indeed, the individual may have voted
against the politician who claims to represent her in Congress.
Although international action can be promoted by nongovernmental
individuals (e.g., Raphael Lempkin), the more common methodology is
that reform proposals from individuals get taken up by a group. As Professor Feilchenfeld explained in 1938:
The most common reform method in world affairs in our age has been
this: Individuals advance suggestions for a particular reform. These
suggestions, quite frequently, are then taken up by organisations concerned with reform work of various kinds. The organisation concerned
may be a private one, such as the Institut de Droit International, composed of international lawyers selected for membership by an international academy. Or, it may be a public one, such as the International
Labour Office.87

He further noted that “Much reform work has been done in this way, and
it is difficult to see how reform work might, under present conditions, be
started otherwise.”88 This insight is strikingly similar to the observation
attributed to Margaret Mead: “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing
that ever has.”
Viewing the IO as a community also provides a solution to the conundrum of the nature of the role played by actors within the IO. For example, the WTO contains a court-like dispute settlement system (indeed the
strongest court in any IO), a parliament-like Ministerial Conference, and
86. Am. L. Inst., Statement of Essential Human Rights, 243 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 18, 20, art. 5 (1946).
87. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 22, at 68.
88. Id.
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an executive-like Director-General.89 Clearly, the WTO Appellate Body
and the Director-General have separate wills, but how do these wills relate to the purported will of the WTO? In my view, there is no aggregate
will or volition of the WTO itself. “Willness,” so to speak, exists only in
the volition of the individuals who act out different roles, such as judges,
government negotiators, and WTO bureaucrats. For example, if the urgently needed Doha Trade round is concluded in 2011, it is not because
the WTO itself decides to go forward, but because a critical mass of the
WTO’s actors jointly agrees to go forward.
The core activity in the IO as a community is deliberation.90 Lawmaking too may occur, but it does so only as an end product of cosmopolitan
conversation. While NGOs can be kept on the sidelines when so-called
lawmaking occurs within an IO, there can hardly be any grounds for excluding NGOs from the conversation that precedes lawmaking.
Herbert Shenton was an early theorist of how conversation sparked by
private associations has the capacity to change international outcomes.91
Although Shenton’s particular interest was the interplay of different languages spoken by NGOs at international conferences, Shenton, writing in
1933, was also one of the earliest scholars tracking private participation
in international affairs.92 As he explains:
When people from all over the world come together thus to confer on
matters of general interest, this intercourse takes on the nature of cosmopolitan conversation. . . . This new habit of cosmopolitan conversation is in a sense a new folkway . . . . At least, it is a new way of doing
things in the world, and it is fraught with limitless possibilities, in terms
of mutual understanding that may lead to a more intelligent public
opinion on matters affecting the various nations of the world.93
....

89. See JAN WOUTERS & BART DE MEESTER, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 187–88, 220–21, 226–51 (2007).
90. See generally Faina Milman-Sivan, The Virtuous Cycle: A New Paradigm for
Democratizing Global Governance through Deliberation, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 801
(2009).
91. See generally HERBERT NEWHARD SHENTON, COSMOPOLITAN CONVERSATION: THE
LANGUAGE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES (1933). For a good discussion of
the meaning of cosmopolitanism in an international law context, see Brian F. Havel &
Gabriel S. Sanchez, Restoring Global Aviation’s “Cosmopolitan Mentalité,” 29 B.U.
INT’L L. J. 1, 5–11 (2011).
92. See generally SHENTON, supra note 91. Lyman Cromwell White also wrote a
pioneering book about NGOs in 1933. See LYMAN CROMWELL WHITE, THE STRUCTURE
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1933).
93. SHENTON, supra note 91, at 12–13.

2011] ILLEGITIMACY OF PREVENTING NGO PARTICIPATION

909

. . . It should be noted also that many private conferences were followed by formal public conferences, which established international
agreements and conventions recommended by the private conferences.
Thus, and in other ways, have these private concourses generated new
international stateways.94

Although Shenton, a sociologist, did not draw any legal conclusions
about the normativity of the “new international stateways,” his theory
highlighted the importance of conversation in international decisionmaking. Shenton recognized that such discourse is cosmopolitan in nature
and that private folkways were changing state-to-state ways.95
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article considers the question of whether it is legitimate for an international organization to refuse NGO participation. As background to
that question, the Article provides an overview of the literature on the
role, status, and legitimacy of international NGOs. Next, the Article postulates seven ways in which NGOs add value to the international system.
Then, the Article pioneers a new approach to the study of IOs by introducing and utilizing three frames as to the ontology of international organizations.
In the first frame, denoted as state positivism, the duty of the IO toward NGOs is decomposed into the duties of the member states of the
IO. In other words, this frame suggests that the IO itself is not really an
autonomous actor and so decisions about NGO participation are made by
the member states for the IO. In exploring this frame, the article contrasts
the majority and the minority views. The majority view is that states do
not have an obligation under international law to allow NGO contestation
within the IO. The minority view is that such a right may exist. My own
scholarship associates with the minority view and suggests that state
practice is moving toward a duty to consult NGOs in the activities of
IOs.
In the second frame, denoted as IO functionalism, the IO, as a legal
person, is seen as manifesting its own will as to whether to consult
NGOs. The Article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages for the IO
in consulting with NGOs, and then offers a theory that a rational IO
would willingly decide to involve NGOs in its work. The more difficult
question is whether the IO has a legal duty to consult NGOs. This Article

94. Id. at 452.
95. Shenton died in 1937 and thus did not live to see or chronicle the expansion of
NGO activity in the United Nations.
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suggests that the IO has a duty to consult NGOs if doing so would promote the IO’s purpose.
In the third frame, denoted as community, the IO is viewed not as a being with personality, but rather as an arena where the true participants
deliberate. The key participant in each international community is the
individual, and the Article explains why the individual is the true basic
unit for the international system. Since human individuals by nature are
sociable, freedom of association has to be seen as the core principle of
international law and community. Although this idea is sometimes characterized as being a byproduct of the postwar twentieth century human
rights movement, the Article points out that the centrality of freedom of
association and individual agency were recognized no later than the nineteenth century, particularly in the Papal encyclical Rerum Novarum and
in Lorimer’s Institutes of the Law of Nations.
By the early 1930s, the activism by NGOs in international conferences
had inspired the Columbia University sociologist Herbert Shenton to
coin the term “cosmopolitan conversation,” which he used to describe
the discourse with IOs and other conferences. Most notably, Shenton
recognized the patterns of NGO participation as representing new “international stateways.” Contemporary NGO scholars should better appreciate Shenton’s work for its many cogent insights as to how practice in
international conferences had been changing to accommodate contributions by NGOs. And perhaps, in detecting new international stateways,
Shenton was also recording the birth of a new legal obligation to welcome NGOs into the world community.

